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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW IN 
PERSPECTIVE: THREE CONCEPTS 
OF EQUALITY 
John J. Donohue III* 
Over the past fifty years, the body of law prohibiting discrimina-
tion in employment has grown enormously in terms of the extent of 
geographic coverage, the range of covered employers, the array of 
protected workers, and the spectrum of prohibited practices. Be-
ginning in the mid-1940s, states began passing Fair Employment 
Practices laws that generally prohibited discrimination on the basis 
of race, color, religion, or national origin. Over the next two 
decades, the geographic reach of these laws .spread as most states 
outside the South enacted some form of this legislation. With the 
passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 the legal prohi-
bition became national in scope and the categories of protected 
workers were extended to include women. In successive years, 
more employers came within the regulatory domain of Title VII as 
the required number of workers in a covered firm dropped from 
one hundred to fifteen,2 and in 1972 Congress extended the reach 
of the law to state and local government and educational institu-
tions.3 Then, in the mid-1970s, the prohibition against racial dis-
crimination was extended to all employers through the Supreme 
Court's decision in Runyon v. McCrary, 4 which interpreted the cen-
tury-old 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as providing a remedy for racial discrimi-
nation that was independent of Title VII and therefore not bound 
by the latter's exemption of small employers. 
* Class of 1967 James B. Haddad Professor of Law, Northwestern University; Research 
Fellow, American Bar Foundation. B.A. 1974, Hamilton; J.D. 1977, Harvard; M.A. 1982, 
M.Phil. 1984, Ph.D. (Economics) 1986, Yale. - Ed. The author thanks Peter Siegelman for 
his helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay. 
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as 
amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). 
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 stat. 241, 253-66 (establishing 
incremental implementation of the Act with 100 employees as the statutory minimum the 
first year, 75 the second, 50 the third, and 25 thereafter); Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 2(2), 3, 86 Stat. 103, 103-04 (lowering the statutory mini-
mum from 25 to 15 to be effective one year after enactment). 
3. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 2(2) 3, 86 Stat. 
103, 103-04 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-1). 
4. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
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Prior to 1971, employment discrimination laws had banned only 
intentional discrimination. But in the first Supreme Court case in-
terpreting Title VII, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,5 Chief Justice 
Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, extended the reach of the 
law through the novel formulation of the disparate impact doctrine 
- which prohibited the application of neutral employment prac-
tices that generated adverse effects upon the protected classes spec-
ified in Title VII, absent a showing that the practices were justified 
by business necessity. Since then, subsequent decisions and legisla-
tive enactments have banned an array of diverse practices - rang-
ing from actuarially based pension plans6 and exclusions of 
childbirth expenses from employer health insurance plans7 to sex-
ual harassment8 - that were not at first seen as discriminatory. In 
addition, the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act,9 the Americans with Disabilities Act, 10 and a large array of 
state and local employment discrimination laws that are more ex-
pansive than Title VII11 has greatly broadened the number of work-
ers falling into some protected category. 
One might suppose that the burgeoning corpus of employment 
discrimination law reflects a consensus that this form of regulation 
has been working well and should be expanded. But the conten-
tious and protracted struggle among the Supreme Court, Congress, 
and the Bush administration that culminated in the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991,12 as well as the growing academic debate 
over the appropriate scope of employment discrimination law, belie 
this view. There are deep disagreements about whether the country 
would be best served by a reduction or an intensification of the 
legal attack on employment discrimination. This essay attempts to 
provide a conceptual framework with which one can assess both the 
5. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
6. See City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
7. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)), overturned the Supreme Court's decision in 
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), which had permitted discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy. 
8. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
9. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1988)). 
10. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (Supp. 
III 1991)). 
11. Although federal law does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion or against cigarette smokers, many state and local governments do. See infra notes 14, 
16. 
12. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. 
III 1991)). 
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enormous transformations of employment discrimination law and 
the continuing disagreements over its proper scope. The thrust of 
the argument is that the initial creation and subsequent growth of 
employment discrimination law has been generated by the develop-
ment over time of a richer conception of the demands of equality, 
while the antagonism between the contending parties is ai least in 
part explained by differences concerning which version of equality 
best describes the modern labor market. 
The essay begins with a discussion of which groups deserve the 
protection of employment discrimination law. With the protected 
categories of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act etched into the 
American consciousness, many might consider the appropriate cat-
egories to be fully self-evident. But of course, they are not, and 
many jurisdictions continue to struggle over whether certain dis-
preferred groups merit the law's solicitude. 
Over time, three different conceptions of equality have influ-
enced the development of employment discrimination law. Before 
World War II, the nation's willingness to accept the outcomes gen-
erated by competitive labor markets was premised on an implicit 
conception of equality - namely, that a worker's wage should 
equal the market-determined value of the individual's labor. I refer 
to this concept of equality as "contingent equality" because a 
worker's value often depended on the degree of discrimination 
against a particular group of workers - and therefore was contin-
gent on attitudes about the worker and not just on his work. As 
Part II discusses, there is a distinction between the equality one can 
expect from a competitive labor market and the greater degree of 
equality that is generated by a more perfectly competitive market 
such as an efficient capital market. Capital markets ensure that the 
price of assets will equal their value even in the presence of severe 
bias or discriminatory attitudes on the part of investors. The capital 
market equates price not with mere contingent value but with in-
trinsic value and in this sense guarantees "intrinsic equality." The 
initial goal of employment discrimination law was to provide intrin-
sic equality, which the free labor market could not deliver, to the 
enumerated protected classes. But while a consensus has emerged 
that intrinsic equality is a desirable goal for protected workers, 
there is significant disagreement regarding both the extent to which 
intrinsic equality has already been achieved and the degree to 
which the goal itself is adequate. A richer notion of equality, which 
I refer to as "constructed equality," has motivated much of the 
growth of employment discrimination law in an effort to go beyond 
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the protections that even a perfectly competitive market would 
afford. · 
Part III illustrates that the early civil rights movement sought to 
achieve the equivalent of intrinsic equality for black workers; the 
goal was to have black workers receive what would be the true 
value of their labor in a nondiscriminatory environment. Some of 
the principled opponents of antidiscrimination law in the early 
1960s based their opposition on the view that intrinsic equality al-
ready existed. Many of the principled opponents of today believe 
that intrinsic equality has now been achieved and thereby deny the 
continued need for legal intervention in labor markets to protect 
female and minority workers. Yet, while the labor market has ten-
dencies pushing in the direction of intrinsic equality, there is likely 
to be a significant difference between contingent equality - which 
is all that workers can hope for without government intervention -
and intrinsic equality. 
Part IV shows that although women, the elderly, and the dis-
abled at first embraced the quest for intrinsic equality, the closer 
they have come to achieving it the more they have sought to reject 
it as the goal of employment discrimination law. Law increasingly 
seeks and requires a higher degree of equality - "constructed 
equality." Rather than compelling employers to pay protected 
workers the true value of their productivity by equating wages and 
intrinsic value, the demand is to have employers make workers 
equal. Although the market was often an ally - albeit at times an 
inconsistent one - of the quest for intrinsic equality for protected 
workers, the market cannot achieve constructed equality. In fact, 
the market relentlessly opposes it. 
I. WHO DESERVES SPECIAL PROTECTION? 
Employm~nt discrimination laws forbid employers from consid-
ering various attributes - such as race, sex, religion, or national 
origin - in making employment decisions. This formal command 
to disregard particular characteristics of workers is based on the 
premise that bearers of these characteristics should be treated 
equally with members of some favored comparison group who lack 
these traits - perhaps white males under the age of forty. But who 
deserves special protection? The State of Israel prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex but not on the basis of religion.13 Do the 
13. See Employment {Equal Opportunities) Law, 5741-1981 {1981), 35 LAWS OF THE 
STATE OF ISRAEL 350 (authorized translation from the Hebrew prepared at the Israel Minis-
try of Justice). 
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unique religious tensions that exist in that country argue in favor of 
or against the exclusion of religion from the list of protected catego-
ries? Some state and local jurisdictions in the United States have 
prohibited discrimination against gays,14 overweight individuals,1s 
and cigarette smokers,16 while others have rejected these claims. 
Defining the appropriate characteristics of workers that merit the 
special solicitude of employment discrimination law is not a simple 
task. Yet this process of definition is an important one, because 
every expansion of the categories to he given special consideration 
carries the risk of diluting the protections afforded to the groups 
already defined.17 
The problem is particularly difficult because numerous factors 
appear relevant to the determination of protected classes, and in 
many cases the factors offer conflicting signals. For example, at first 
glance, it seems relatively unobjectionable that older workers 
should be given special protection. We help the elderly across 
roads and we give them special seating on public transportation, so 
why not give them a little break in the work arena? Perhaps sur-
prisingly, though, the large majority of cases brought under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act - and the cases resulting in the 
largest awards by far of all employment discrimination suits - are 
brought by white, male professionals and managers.18 This is not a 
14. Eight states and over 100 municipalities prohibit discrimination in employment on the 
basis of sexual orientation. Jeffrey S. Byrne, Affirmative Action for Lesbians and Gay Men: 
A Proposal for True Equality of Opportunity and Workforce Diversity, 11 YALE L. & POLY. 
Rev. 47, 63 (1993). 
15. California law protects from employment discrimination overweight individuals who 
can establish on the basis of medical evidence that their excessive weight was the result of a 
physiological condition affecting one or more basic bodily symptoms and limiting a major life 
activity. Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993). Michigan is the only 
state that has codified a prohibition against employment discrimination on the basis of 
weight. M1cH. CoMP. LAWS§ 37.2102 (1979). See generally Comment, Employment Discrim-
ination Against Overweight Individuals: Should Obesity Be a Protected Classification?, 30 
SANTA CLARA L. Rev. 951 (1990). 
'") 
16. For examples, see John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Em-
ployment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. Rev. 1583, 1614 n.147 (1992) (reviewing RICHARD 
A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
{1992)), and the sources cited therein. 
17. This problem was highlighted in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 
(1979), in which female job candidates were severely disadvantaged by laws providing prefer-
ences to veterans. 
18. Seventy-three percent of ADEA cases in which no other claim of discrimination was 
raised - that is, pure ADEA cases - and in which race and gender w~re identifiable from 
case files were brought by white males, and 67% were filed by managers and professionals. 
The average monetary judgment per plaintiff was $135,574 in pure ADEA cases and $15,206 
in non-ADEA cases. For a discussion of the data set from which these calculations were 
made, see John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. Rev. 983 {1991). 
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class of individuals that one normally would consider to be in need 
of special legal protections. 
Even groups with seemingly unassailable claims for privileged 
treatment can possess characteristics that at least raise the question 
whether the goal of equality, when broadly considered, is furthered 
by such privileged treatment. The reason for this counterintuitive 
speculation is that it is possible for a group to be somewhat disad-
vantaged in the labor market - and thus, from this narrow per-
spective, legitimately entitled to special protections - but at the 
same time relatively advantaged in other measures of well-being. 
In such cases it is conceivable that the attainment of equality in the 
labor market without equality in other spheres important to human 
well-being might actually undermine a more broadly conceived no-
tion of equality of human well-being. One might think of this prop-
osition as a form of the "Theory of Second Best" applied to the 
concept of equality.19 
This possibility may be illustrated by an examination of the 
United Nation's Human Development Report,20 which seeks to 
evaluate how various countries succeed in enhancing the human po-
tential of their citizens and in creating an environment that enables 
the full use of human capabilities. The consultant on the United 
Nations project was the famed economist Amartya Sen, who devel-
oped a Human Development Index (HDI) based on longevity, edu-
cational attainment, and access to resources, designed to measure 
"people's ability to live a long and healthy life, to communicate and 
to participate in the life of the community and to have sufficient 
resources to obtain a decent living."21 While in many ways the rank 
order of various countries according to this Human Development 
Index accords with one's intuitions, the most surprising finding is 
that on this measure of human well-being, white women in America 
- the primary beneficiaries of sex discrimination law - come out 
ahead of not only every other demographic group in the United 
States but also the citizens of every other country in the world.22 
19. The well-known Theory of Second Best teaches that when multiple market imperfec• 
tions exist, the elimination of any single market imperfection may actually lower total social 
welfare. R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. 
EcoN. STUD. 11 (1956-1957). More broadly, the theory can be thought of as implying that 
when one is dealing with a large and interdependent problem - such as the pursuit of equal· 
ity in the complex modem world - optimizing the solution to only one component part of 
the problem may actually make the overall problem worse. 
20. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993 (1993), 
21. Id. at 104. 
22. Id. at 18. 
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This finding is particularly surprising because Sen in part de-
vised the index out of his concern for the poor treatment of women 
throughout the world.23 Nonetheless, white women in the United 
States stand at the top of the list with an HDI value of about 1.0, 
while white males in the United States, with an HDI value of only 
approximately 0.975, are surpassed by the citizens of Japan, Can-
ada, Norway, Switzerland, and Sweden.24 By comparison, black fe-
males have an HDI of only about 0.9, which puts them on a par 
with the citizens of Greece, and black males have an HDI just 
above 0.85, placing them at about the level of the citizens of Bulga-
ria.25 Of course, simply having the longest life-span, the most edu-
cation, and considerable access to resources does not establish the 
attractiveness of the lives of a particular group, and there are obvi-
ous shortcomings in the Human Development Index.26 But it does 
suggest that the numerically largest protected class of workers -
white women - compares quite well on a number of important 
dimensions of well-being, not only in relation to other protected 
classes of workers, but also in relation to the presumably favored 
comparison group of white men. 
While the Human Development Index may offer a counterintui-
tive perspective on the relative status of white women, it strongly 
buttresses the conventional view that black Americans enjoy a far 
lower degree of well-being than white Americans, even after the 
substantial gains that occurred following the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Certainly, at the time of the debate over this 
Act in the early 1960s, black Americans had an exceptionally strong 
claim to the solicitude of federal employment discrimination law, 
23. Sen's most arresting finding was that owing to poor treatment of women, infanticide, 
and selective abortion, there were perhaps 100 million women missing in the world from the 
numbers one would expect if women and girls were treated equally with men. Id. at 25. 
24. Compare id. at 11 tbl. 1.1 with id. at 18 fig. 1.13. 
25. Id. at 18 fig. 1.13. 
26. For each dimension of the HDI - longevity, educational attainment, and access to 
resources - a value is calculated ranging from 0 to 1. The HDI is the equal-weighted aver-
age of these three numbers, which can therefore range from a low of 0 to a high of 1. Ameri-
can women surpass American men by 10% in terms of longevity and by 2% in terms of 
education but fall below them in terms of income. Id. at 196. The index is computed in such 
a way that increases in income that are substantially above the poverty threshold have a 
decreasingly proportional impact on the HDI. Thus, at the high levels of income of both 
American men and women in comparison with world income figures, the income shortfall of 
American women receives less weight in the HDI than the advantages that American women 
enjoy in life-span and education. Thus, despite the Development Report's position that "the 
HDI is particularly well-suited to examining gender inequalities" and that "[a] constant con-
cern in constructing the HDI has been to preserve its universality - to retain a single index 
for both the rich and poor countries," there are reasons for caution in using it to examine 
gender disparities within the wealthiest nations. Id. at 111. 
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for not only had they experienced the egregious oppression of slav-
ery for over two hundred years prior to 1865, but they also suffered 
from enormous public and private discrimination, hostility, and vio-
lence for the next one hundred years, coupled with substantial rela-
tive economic deprivation. Without question, American blacks, 
most conspicuously in the South, were earning less for their labor 
than otherwise identical white workers were earning, and this was a 
major source of inequality that Title VII was designed to redress. 
I have alluded to the multidimensional growth in the body of 
employment discrimination law over the last fifty years, and this 
Part has examined some of the issues that arise along the single 
dimension of determining which groups should be protected. But 
in turning now to a discussion of the progressive demands of what 
"equality" requires, one must keep in mind that as society attempts 
to provide protected groups with increasingly more than a free-
market allocation would render, the conflict between who deserves 
protection and how much protection they get can become acute. In 
the extreme case, affirmative action for all becomes affirmative ac-
tion for no one. 
II. PRICE AND VALUE 
Because southern blacks in the early 1960s earned dramatically 
less than the benchmark group of otherwise identical southern 
white workers,27 one can conclude that southern blacks were earn-
ing less than their "true value." But because wages are simply the 
price paid to labor, and because one of the hallmarks - indeed the 
very defining characteristic - of a competitive market is that price 
equals value, we are confronted with something of an anomaly.28 
Either the southern labor market was not competitive, in which 
case it is not particularly surprising that the price paid to black la-
bor did not equal its value,29 or, more plausibly, it was broadly com-
petitive but the "value" of black workers did not equal the "value" 
of the otherwise identical white workers. 
27. See generally John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic 
Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. EcoN. 
LITERATURE 1603 (1991). 
28. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART c. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 11 (4th ed. 1991) ("[I]f there is a good market for an asset, its value is exactly the 
same as the market price."). 
29. Richard Epstein believes that the southern labor market was not competitive because 
of interference by racist governmental restrictions. See EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 244-54. 
While Epstein may be correct, the evidence in support of this claim is somewhat limited. 
Donohue, supra note 16, at 1594. 
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In order to address this apparent anomaly, it may be helpful to 
elaborate on the concept of a perfectly competitive market. As I 
noted above, a perfectly competitive market is one in which the 
value of an asset equals its price. Perhaps the best illustration of 
such a market is the market for financial securities. Here the 
hallmarks of perfect competition are most in evidence: all the 
shares of a given company's stock are perfectly fungible, and mil-
lions of investors and money managers spend much time and effort 
trying to ascertain the true value of these shares. Moreover, when 
investors perceive any divergence between value and price, they 
can buy or sell the under- or overvalued security very quickly in a 
trading market that has very low transaction costs. 
A. Perfectly Competitive Markets and Intrinsic Equality 
These features of modem capital markets imply that there will 
be a strong tendency for price and value to be equal. If the price of 
a capital asset, such as a financial security, is below its true value, a 
host of offers to purchase will tend to elevate the price to the point 
at which the price-value discrepancy is eliminated. Conversely, if 
the price of an asset lingers above the true value, the downward 
pressures on price ,operate quickly as owners of the asset try to sell 
it. Even nonowners can facilitate the rapid price drop toward the 
true value through the use of short sales. With so much at stake in 
discerning whether price equates with value~ with only a few thou-
sand stocks that need to be valued, with tens of thousands of ana-
lysts spending all their time trying to ascertain this value, and with 
the fantastic volume of stock trading that provides at very low cost 
virtually constant updates on the latest assessment of value by 
knowledgeable market participants, the stock market is unparal-
leled in the degree to which it approximates the perfectly competi-
tive market.3° 
Consider the situation in which someone tries to sell authentic 
$20 bills to the highest bidders. Tue demand curve for such $20 
bills would be perfectly horizontal (elastic), because no one would 
pay more than $20 to receive such a bill, and if buyers could 
purchase the bill at anything less than $20, the quantity demanded 
would become infinite. Even if a large majority of buyers have 
some personal reason that keeps them from purchasing the $20 
bills, there will certainly be more than enough demand to bid up the 
30. Stephen A. Ross, The Interrelations of Finance and Economics: Theoretical Perspec-
tives, AM. EcoN. REv., May 1987, at 29, 30 ("[F]inancial markets are extremely liquid and as 
close to our purely competitive ideal as one can find in the real world."). 
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price of the bills should it slip below $20. The intuition behind this 
example explains why "[t]he conventional wisdom among legal 
scholars and financial economists is that demand for stock (as well 
as other securities) is horizontal."31 Although the task of valuing 
corporate securities is not as trivial as that of valuing paper cur-
rency, securities analysts do a good enough job in this enterprise to 
make the analogy a useful one. 
The implication of this discussion is that there is little need to 
fear the problem of the undervaluing of a corporate security. The 
owner of a corporate security can sell the security at a price equal-
ing its value even if a great number of individuals were for some 
reason "prejudiced" against the owner or the particular corpora-
tion. Investors in capital markets are interested only in the 
nondiversifiable risk and the expected returns for differing securi-
ties, and they tend to price securities accordingly. One confirma-
tory piece of evidence on this score is that there is no call for 
government regulation - other than a requirement that relevant 
information possessed by the management of firms whose securities 
trade in the organized securities markets be disclosed in a timely 
fashion - to assure that price and value are equated. 
One point in particular should be underscored. The existence of 
irrational biases or prejudices on the part of investors does not pre-
vent capital markets from ensuring that price equals value. One 
might suppose that this statement tells more about the relative lack 
of prejudice in investors than about the ability of capital markets to 
equalize price and value. Proponents of this view would argue that 
while there is much in the real world and the social psychological 
literature to suggest that some Americans harbor strong prejudices 
- at times, rising to the level of intense hatred - against blacks or 
women or other identifiable categories of workers, there is little 
reason to think that such emotions are aroused by sterile assets like 
corporate securities. But this view underestimates the passions and 
biases of investors and overlooks the institutional features of capital 
markets that tend to eradicate their influence over price. To begin 
with, because trading takes place through brokers on an organized 
exchange, most investors would never be in a position to know who 
the previous owner of a corporate security was, and therefore there 
31. Richard Booth, The Efficient Market, Portfolio Theory, and the Downward Sloping 
Demand Hypothesis, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1187, 1187 {1993). 
August 1994) Three Concepts of Equality 2593 
would be no opportunity to avoid purchasing or selling a particular 
stock, say, because one did not like its prior or prospective owner.32 
Moreover, even if many investors find a certain company or 
product distasteful, the shares of that company's stock should still 
trade at full value. It is undoubtedly the case that significant num-
bers of investors have biases against holding certain actively traded 
securities. Some may feel that Dow Chemical should be shunned 
because it manufactured napalm during the Vietnam War. There 
are no doubt large numbers of investors who believe that gambling 
is wrong and therefore avoid purchasing the stock of casino enter-
prises, or who believe that tobacco companies are the merchants of 
death and therefore avoid purchasing their stocks, or who shunned 
the stocks of companies investing in preliberation South Africa. 
Others may simply shun stocks altogether because of memories or 
fears of the stock crash or for some other reason. 
Furthermore, some investors may avoid certain stocks, not out 
of a sense of personal or political distaste, but rather from errone-
ous beliefs about the future profitability of certain companies or 
particular enterprises. Some may believe that video laser disks rep-
resent the technology of the future even though videotapes have 
almost completely displaced them. But as long as the market is per-
fectly competitive and a sufficiently large number of other investors 
are concerned only with the risk and return of financial assets, the 
auction quality of these markets should bid up the price of these 
assets to their full value. In other words, because there are enough 
investors who care only about maximizing profits and who can 
quickly and cheaply purchase any undervalued securities, prejudice 
against a security owner or a company simply cannot cause the 
price of a security to diverge from its value. These biases do not 
pose a concern to issuers of stock or to those who own stock be-
cause millions of investors are trying to ascertain the value of a se-
curity, and others who do not carry biases against the particular 
stock will be happy to step in to fill the void if the stock can be 
purchased at a price below its value. 
32. Obviously, not all sales of assets are shielded from the effects of discrimination. Con-
sider, for example, the studies documenting discrimination in the sales of houses and 
automobiles. See, e.g., Reynolds Farley & William H. Frey, Changes in the Segregation of 
Whites From Blacks During the 1980s: Small Steps Toward a More Integrated Society, 59 AM. 
Soc. REv. 23, 33 (1994); Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail 
Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REv. 817 (1991). Moreover, for a vivid depiction of the 
apparent satisfaction that a biased and unoccupied shoe salesman could obtain from refusing 
to acknowledge the existence of a black customer, see Primetime Live: True Colors (ABC 
television broadcast, Sept. 26, 1991). 
2594 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:2583 
But confidence that the market will assure the equality of value 
and price does not extend to all markets. Indeed, the very existence 
of employment discrimination law would seem to reflect the enor-
mous concern over precisely this question in labor markets. Conse-
quently, one of the major goals of the civil rights movement and the 
women's movement was to achieve a federal guarantee that the 
wages of workers in certain protected classes equaled the value of 
what those workers would produce in a perfectly competitive -
and nondiscriminatory - market. 
Note that the appended qualification that the market be nondis-
criminatory was deemed superfluous in the case of capital markets. 
Price equaled value in that context even if many investors were 
highly prejudiced. But this statement cannot always be made in less 
efficient markets. For example, the typical southern black in 1955 
had no expectation of being able to sell his labor at a price equaling 
its value in a nondiscriminatory environment. Indeed, the wide-
spread exclusion of blacks from certain enterprises and occupations 
implicitly offered a price of zero for the labor of black workers 
when there is little doubt that the value of black labor far exceeded 
this amount.33 In other words, for a very extended period of time, 
blacks and women felt that they could not rely on the protections of 
the market to ensure that they would be hired and paid their true 
value. This fundamental fact explains much of the focus of the civil 
rights movement on securing the passage of legislation prohibiting 
discrimination in employment: the goal was to assure that the price 
that protected workers received for their labor was equal to the 
value of their labor in the American economy, so long as value was 
determined only with respect to intrinsic productivity and was not 
distorted by discriminatory preferences of employers, fellow work-
ers, or customers. 
When employers, fellow workers, or customers shun certain 
protected workers for certain jobs, they impose social costs even 
apart from the depressing of wages of the dispreferred group. Such 
sligllts can in themselves cause psychological pain; indeed, the very 
reason members of one group might discriminate is to secure some 
gain in self-esteem at the expense of the other group.34 But for 
now, I want to leave this issue aside and focus only on the question 
33. For example, blacks were widely excluded from the southern textiles industry for 50 
years prior to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See James J. Heckman & Brook S. 
Payner, Determining the Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status 
of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina, 79 AM. EcoN. REV. 138 (1989). 
34. Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status 
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REv. (forthcoming Mar. 1995). 
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of the equality of price and value, or the lack thereof. Why do la-
bor markets fall so short of what capital markets seem to deliver? 
There are two reasons. First, labor markets are far less efficient 
markets than capital markets, and as one departs from the features 
of a perfectly competitive market, the forces that equate price and 
value weaken. Persistent and substantial divergences between price 
and value can exist in imperfect markets. Second, at best labor 
markets can only be expected to equate price with the value of la-
bor as determined not simply by the intrinsic value of the assets as 
in capital markets but by the contingent assessment that will be in-
fluenced by an array of discriminatory participants. Put differently, 
labor markets can only hope to achieve contingent equality, while 
capital markets can deliver the higher ideal of intrinsic equality. I 
will discuss each of these points in turn. 
B. Labor Markets Are Not as Efficient as Capital Markets 
Capital markets possess a number of attributes that make them 
unusually efficient. There are a relatively small number of traded 
equity securities in the United States, and for any given company, 
all the shares of that company's stock are identical. Moreover, at 
any particular point in time, everyone knows or at very small cost 
can learn the price of a stock, as this information is generated 
through the public stock exchanges. At the same time, because 
substantial profits can be made from identifying mispriced stocks, a 
large number of financial analysts and investors are continually try-
ing to ascertain the true value of these stocks. Moreover, once an 
investor has identified an undervalued stock, he can possess that 
stock in a matter of minutes by incurring a relatively low transac-
tion cost. In other words, in capital markets, there are only a rela-
tively small number of prices to get right, and there are huge 
rewards from doing just that. Consequently, analysts and investors 
spend a great deal of time and effort trying to ascertain the correct 
prices of securities, and for little more than the price of a phone call 
and a small commission, they can almost immediately purchase any 
undervalued security they identify.· · 
None of these attributes are characteristic of labor markets. 
There are over 130 million workers in the U.S. labor force,35 and 
each one is different. For the vast majority of jobs, there is rela-
tively little at stake in accurately assessing the true value of any 
single worker, and there is little or no publicly available informa-
35. 1994 ECONOMIC REPORT OF TIIE PRESIDENT 307. 
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tion about the current salaries or productive abilities of workers. 
This means that relatively few individuals are in a position to ascer-
tain whether a worker is receiving a wage that is less than his value, 
and thus few will be interested in doing so. Moreover, even among 
those who are interested, such as prospective employers, there are 
limits on how much they will be willing to spend to determine the 
true productivity of workers because the gains from acquiring such 
information on any single worker are apt to be relatively modest. 
One might think that labor markets have one benefit over capi-
tal markets in that workers themselves advertise their availability 
for work and therefore give employers the ability to learn at low 
cost of the existence of valuable and underpaid workers. But there 
are two reasons why the behavior of workers and applicants does 
not improve the performance of labor markets vis-a-vis capital mar-
kets. First, while workers do not need to wait to be found but can 
take the initiative in contacting prospective employers, this conduct 
adds a new dimension of noise to the search process. All workers 
are trying to signal their availability and talents; this raises the 
transaction costs of those who must sift through the information 
and obscures the signal emerging from the desirable workers. Sec-
ond, while an important difference between capital and labor mar-
kets is that laborers, unlike stock certificates, are alive and able to 
communicate, this difference does not provide an informational ad-
vantage to labor markets because the owner of stock has the same 
incentives to trumpet its value as does the owner of labor. 
Even if undervalued workers can be identified, it is not always a 
simple matter to hire them. The worker may be living on the other 
side of the country, and family connections may impede the easy 
ability of the worker to move to the highest bidder. Even if a 
worker is willing to move to a higher-paying job, transaction costs 
may still be high. For example, assume that because of widespread 
discrimination, firms in the South in 1960 were unwilling to hire 
black workers at a wage equal to their productive value, but that 
firms outside the South, in states where employment discrimination 
laws were then widely in place, were less discriminatory. This as-
sumption would be consistent with the data showing that the wage 
penalty for blacks outside the South was far smaller than it was in 
the South.36 These data suggest that black workers might have 
been able to receive a wage more closely approximating the value 
of their work by simply leaving the South. Of course, such a move 
36. See Donohue & Heckman, supra note 27, at 1610. 
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would have entailed both the monetary costs of relocating and the 
nonmonetary costs of uprooting one's life and leaving family and 
friends behind. For many individuals, these costs were not insur-
mountable, and in fact large numbers of young black men fled the 
South during the twenty-five-year period before the passage of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act.37 But these costs were quite burdensome for 
others, which may explain why the large wage penalties for blacks 
living in the South persisted for such a long duration when moving 
to jobs outside the South would have elevated black wages consid-
erably.38 The fact that it was primarily young black men who left 
the South suggests that the option to circumvent discrimination by 
moving may be more costly for married workers whose spouses 
might then have to change jobs as well. 
These factors highlight the differences between the capital and 
labor markets. There are lots of investors who are eagerly looking 
for underpriced securities, and those securities are quickly snatched 
up if they are found. There are no unemployed stock certificates. 
In capital markets, any investor can profit from recognizing over-
valued stocks through the device of short selling, but in labor mar-
kets only a current employer can benefit from recognizing an 
overvalued worker - by firing the worker or by reducing her com-
pensation, both of which may be costly. Labor markets are much 
less supple and equilibrate more slowly, leaving workers who have 
limited geographic or occupational mobility with little recourse 
from the market for avoiding local discrepancies between the value 
and the price of their labor. While there is only one market for 
corporate securities in this country, there are thousands of labor 
markets. Thus, discrepancies between price and value in the labor 
market, which can be eliminated through the costly migration of 
labor, cannot be eradicated as quickly or as cheaply as similar dis-
crepancies in capital markets. 
Richard Epstein has argued that the cause of the divergence be-
tween black wages and black productivity that existed in the South 
was that the market was plagued by racist governmental restrictions 
and the fear of private violence and thus was not truly competi-
tive.39 But even if Epstein's argument is correct, which is by no 
37. Id. 
38. An alternative explanation might be that black wages as measured in the South were 
understated because a significant portion of black income came from in-kind benefits to agri-
cultural laborers. Under this view, the increase in measured wealth that could have been 
achieved if blacks had moved out of the South would overstate the gain in real income. 
39. See EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 246-54. 
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means certain, it still underscores the difference between labor mar-
kets and capital markets. Even if no one in the South would buy 
the stock of say, Ford Motor Company, it would still not dampen 
the price of Ford stock. Northerners would simply buy more and 
bid up the price to the true value. The same phenomenon would 
not be true if all southerners refused to hire black workers. Absent 
massive black out-migration or massive in-migration of unbiased 
entrepreneurs that Epstein claims was blocked by government re-
strictions and violence, black wages would fall below the marginal 
product of black labor. 
The many differences between the two markets reveal that the 
success of capital markets in equating price and value is an ideal 
that labor markets might approach but never reach. In capital mar-
kets the high profits that are attainable through identifying diver-
gences between price and value ensure that correct pricing of 
individual securities will be the norm. In labor markets, by con-
trast, the relatively small value and high cost of determining worker 
productivity ensures that employers will frequently find it profitable 
not to determine the correct prices for individual workers. Instead, 
employers often use cheap proxies such as race and sex to approxi-
mate true worker value. In other words, statistical discrimination 
cannot exist in capital markets but can thrive in labor markets. 
Unlike capital assets, labor assets - that is, workers - are not 
mere passive investments; therefore, statistical discrimination will 
likely distort workers' decisions with regard to investment in human 
capital. If a member of a group knows that he will be treated as 
though he possesses the average traits of all group members, he will 
have no incentive to make investments that would increase his pro-
ductivity. Thus, there may be an efficiency rationale for prohibiting 
statistical discrimination against protected workers in labor mar-
kets,40 which Title VII clearly does. 
Moreover, even though one would always expect capital mar-
kets to outperform labor markets in equating price and value, capi-
tal markets themselves have at times experienced substantial long-
term deviations between price and value. As Peter Bernstein notes, 
"An efficient market is not necessarily a rational market, nor is the 
information it reflects always accurate. Investors in their enthusi-
asm, or in their collective gloom, sometimes agree among them-
selves that certain stocks are somehow worth more or less than 
40. See Shelly J. Lundberg & Richard Startz, Private Discrimination and Social Interven-
tion in Competitive Labor Markets, 73 AM. EcoN. REV. 340 (1983) (rebutting the common 
presumption that equality-enhancing measures generally cause efficiency losses). 
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their intrinsic values. "41 These deviations between price and value, 
even in the relatively efficient capital market, can be remarkably 
persistent. For example, over the past sixty-three years the returns 
on small-company stocks have exceeded the returns on large-com-
pany stocks to a degree that is far greater than their higher risk can 
explain.42 If substantial discrepancies between the price and value 
of corporate securities, however unusual, can persist for long dura-
tions, it should hardly be surprising that extended deviations be-
tween the price and value of groups of workers can persist over 
long periods of time. 
C. Contingent Value Versus Intrinsic Value 
The value of a stock is determined by the discounted stream of 
future earnings that will be conveyed to its owner. Thus, if one 
knows the stream of expected earnings, one can determine the 
stock's value by simply discounting with the appropriate discount 
rate. The discount rate is asce_rtained through the application of the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model, which relies upon a proper estimation 
of the firm's systematic risk, or "beta."43 Any two securities with 
similar beta and expected return will trade at the same price. In 
other words, one need look only at the intrinsic aspects of the se-
curity - its systematic risk and its expected return - to determine 
its price. Contingent factors - the preferences of other parties -
operate only on the demand for the company's product and thus on 
the stock's expected return, not on the price of the security once 
that return has been established. Thus, if the demand for cigarettes 
plummets because fewer individuals wish to smoke, the expected 
returns to the owners of tobacco company stocks will fall. As those 
expected returns fall, so will the price of the stock. But the price of 
the stock will still exactly equal the value of any other asset that 
41. PETER BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL 
STREET 137 (1992). 
42. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 28, at 296-97. This may not be a sign of a long-term 
deviation between price and value if small stocks suffer some other defect, such as lack of 
ready marketability, but the fact that much of the superior performance is concentrated dur-
ing the first week of January would seem to undermine that speculation. As the authors of a 
prominent textbook conclude: "It is difficult to imagine any reasonable model of equilibrium 
consistent with the efficient-market hypothesis that could also be consistent with [these] re-
sults." STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 353 (2d ed. 1990). 
43. Beta indicates how volatile a particular asset is compared with the overall market. A 
stock with a beta of 1 would have the same nondiversifiable risk as the market as a whole and 
would therefore have a discount rate equal to the expected return on the market. A stock 
with a beta in excess of 1 would have greater nondiversifiable risk than the market portfolio 
and would therefore have a higher discount rate. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 28, at 161-
69. 
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generates a similar expected return with the same degree of system-
atic risk. Thus, the capital market overcomes the biases, prejudices, 
and tastes of those who trade in capital markets; it does not over-
come the biases, prejudices, and tastes of those who purchase the 
products of a particular company. 
In contrast, the price of labor is not determined entirely by the 
intrinsic productivity of the worker. Rather, it will be determined 
by a host of extrinsic factors, including the various preferences of 
employers, fellow workers, and customers. In other words, one 
cannot look only to a laborer's physical product to determine his 
value; one must also look to the preferences of others with regard 
to associating with that worker. If many fellow workers or custom-
ers are particularly drawn to a worker, his wage will be higher for 
any given level of actual production. For example, if Mickey 
Mantle and Willie Mays are baseball players of equal talent but fans 
prefer to watch Mantle because he is white, Mantle may be ex-
pected to earn more in a competitive market. In other words, his 
"value" is not simply determined by his baseball ability but also by 
the effect he has on the audience. Put differently, his value is con-
tingent upon the preferences of others and not on his intrinsic skills 
as a batter and fielder.44 
The major economic burden imposed by employment discrimi-
nation is the diver~ence between the price paid to certain classes of 
labor and the true value of this labor. In other words, in a perfectly 
competitive market with zero or low transaction costs, one would 
not expect a divergence between; say, the wages of blacks and the 
true productivity of blacks.45 A worker whose productivity sub-
stantially exceeds her wage will be in great demand. If the labor 
market worked like the stock market, we would expect the price -
wage - of this worker to be bid up rather quickly until the diver-
gence between price and value was eliminated. Thus, if the labor 
market were as perfectly competitive as the stock market, there 
44. Some evidence of such customer discrimination in baseball has been offered from an 
analysis of the trading price of baseball cards. See Clark Nardonelli & Curtis Simon, Ct1s· 
tomer Racial Discrimination in the Market for Memorabilia: The Case of Baseball, 105 QJ. 
EcoN. 575 (1990). After controlling for measurable performance traits, the authors of the 
study found that the cards of white baseball players traded at between 10% and 13% more 
than baseball cards of nonwhite players. Id. at 594. What is true for baseball cards also 
seems to be true in many professional sports: black athletes often seem to earn less than 
their productivity would warrant. For references to studies demonstrating this phenomenon, 
see Donohue, supra note 16, at 1608 n.122. 
45. The qualification about transaction costs being close to zero is necessary to foreclose 
the possibility of a situation - such as the one that existed in the pre-Tiile VII southern 
labor market for blacks - in which those who hire black workers are quickly identified and 
punished via some regime of informal, private sanctions. 
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would be little to fear from discrimination and little need for the 
law to try to add to the protection already provided by the market 
- at least if society is content with providing intrinsic equality to its 
workers.46 
In summary, modem capital markets ensure that the price of an 
actively traded security will equal its value. Most importantly, this 
statement is true regardless of whether or not many investors are 
biased against holding the particular security. The security will 
I 
trade at the same price as if no investors were biased against it. 
Although there are tendencies, perhaps even strong ones, pushing 
the price of labor toward the value of labor, in every dimension 
capital markets will necessarily do a better job of equating price 
and value than labor markets will. 
III. THE GULF BETWEEN CONTINGENT EQUALITY AND 
INTRINSIC EQUALITY 
A. An Idealized Vision of Labor Markets 
Thus far, we have focused on the equality between price and 
value that one can hope to achieve in the capital market and sug-
gested that this is at best an unattainable ideal to which the labor 
market can only aspire. But if one considers the criticisms of em-
ployment discrimination laws by their primary principled oppo-
nents, it becomes clear that those opponents think of the labor 
market as being as perfectly competitive as modem capital markets. 
For example, in 1980 Senator Orrin Hatch wrote: 
The EEOC has sometimes been credited with opening up new pools 
of labor that corporations somehow contrived to ignore, and occa-
sionally with hastening the breakdown of traditional barriers to labor 
mobility. But in the context of the market's endless search for effi-
ciency, these anomalies would have been eliminated anyway, leaving 
only the question of whether they were worth the expenditures com-
pelled by law. Affirmative action is a net cost to the economy .... 
46. One might point out that customer discrimination can lead to the undervaluing of 
black workers, and the market will not root out such discrimination but rather will cater to it. 
This is true because the labor market is not as perfectly competitive as the capital market and 
therefore cannot guarantee intrinsic equality. If the labor market were as perfectly competi-
tive as capital markets, black wages would not be depressed by customer discrimination be-
cause black workers would simply flow to jobs that did not involve customer contact. In such 
a market, blacks would not suffer wage discrimination, although their freedom to pursue 
customer-contact jobs would be impaired. In the actual labor-market world of contingent 
equality, a worker bears the economic burden of trying to achieve intrinsic equality - per-
haps by migrating to another area where nondiscriminatory employers are more abundant; in 
the Title VII-induced effort to achieve intrinsic equality, the economic burden is shifted to 
the employer. The employee can stay where she is, and the employer must pay her full 
intrinsic value. 
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And the true dynamic effects - the opportunity cost of all this ex-
pense and effort, the diminution of competition, inefficiencies due to 
the employment and promotion of marginal labor and the consequent 
demoralization of good workers - can only be a matter of conjec-
ture, although they are clearly the most important of all.47 
A similar theme is echoed by one of the primary scholarly an-
tagonists of employment discrimination law, Richard Epstein: 
[Consider the example of two pools of labor] with substantial varia-
tions in each group, but where the quality of the worker drawn at 
random in one group is known to be higher than in the other. . .. 
When the quality of the workers in the less desired pool exceeds the 
average quality of the remaining workers in the more desirable pool, 
then hiring will migrate toward the second pool, notwithstanding the 
original desire to remain with the preferred talent pool only .... 
Viewing it as a continuous ·process, one should see steady hiring from 
both pools as firms seek the best available worker from any source.48 
But thes~ descriptions of how employers will quickly take ad-
vantage of discrepancies between the value of workers and their 
price focus only on the intrinsic productivity of the workers and 
ignore the contingent value. In other words, this analysis much 
more aptly describes how an investor would quickly buy up any un-
dervalued stock than how an employer would contemplate hiring 
when productivity is not clearly known and certain workers are dis-
preferred. In Hatch's terms, the market might contrive to ignore 
certain categories of labor, not because of the intrinsic productivity 
of this group of workers, but because of the preferences of relevant 
actors to avoid this group. Moreover, Epstein's analysis of the 
choice between hiring a preferred and dispreferred worker presup-
poses that employers would act on their preference in making their 
employment decision only if the productivities of the dispreferred 
and preferred workers were equal; otherwise, the most intrinsically 
productive worker would be chosen. But intense discrimination 
may prevent the employment of any worker from the less desirable 
pool, regardless of intrinsic productivity. For example, it was not 
that long ago that only whites could play major league baseball. 
Certainly, there was a highly talented pool of labor that the market 
had contrived to ignore, and no governmental restriction prevented 
black players from being hired. Moreover, this problem is exacer-
bated when productivity is not easily measured and the dispreferred 
group has some apparent shortcomings, such as lower-quality 
education. 
47. Orrin Hatch, Loading the Economy, 12 POLY. REv., Spring 1980, at 23, 31-32. 
48. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 34-35. 
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B. Discrimination in the Nonidealized Labor Market 
The recent story of discrimination at the Shoney's restaurant 
chain is instructive. The cofounder and longtime. chief executive of-
ficer of Shoney's, Ray Danner, was clearly a highly prejudiced indi-
vidual.49 Several high-ranking Shoney's executives testified to the 
effect that "Danner would say that no one would want to eat at a 
restaurant where 'a bunch of niggers' were working."50 At one 
point, Danner wrote a letter complaining about the perlormance of 
one restaurant in Jacksonville, Florida, and noting that it had more 
blacks - some of whom were subsequently fired - than other 
fast-food restaurants that Danner had visited in the area.51 Indeed, 
judging from Shoney's success with 1800 stores in thirty-six states,52 
Danner's business instincts about what southern white customers 
would want from a low-budget restaurant may, regrettably, not 
have been without substance. In this instance the analysis would be 
different from what Hatch and Epstein suggest: unrestrained 
profit-maximizing firms would in fact avoid hiring blacks in posi-
tions where they could be seen by diners if that were the preference 
of their customers. Indeed, the fact that Denny's and Wendy's res-
taurants have been charged with similar discriminatory conduct 
may reveal that the tendencies toward efficiency in the labor mar-
ket are not always the ally of black workers. 
Moreover, Dann.er in all likelihood did not apply racist business 
theories with the laserlike precision of a profit-maximizer - that is, 
he did not shun blacks for visible positions to please the customers 
but at the same time welcome them in jobs where the customers 
would not see them. Only one out of sixty-eight division directors 
and none of the higher-level 'corporate managers at Shoney's were 
black.53 It would seem that"the hiring policies at Shoney's reflected 
deference not only to the discriminatory attitudes of its customers 
but also to those of its CEO and largest stockholder. But the mar-
ket penalties for this behavior did not seem to be strong, and it was 
only a huge settlement in excess of $100 million in damages coupled 
with a substantial stock-price drop when Danner showed signs of 
resisting the remedial measures designed to increase the ·number of 
49. See Steve Watkins, Racism Du lour at Shoney's, NATION, Oct. 18, 1993, at 424. 
50. Id. at 427 (quoting Thomas Buckner, a former Shoney's division personnel director). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 424. 
53. Id. at 427. 
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black managerial employees that led to Danner's departure from 
Shoney's.s4 
A number of lessons emerge from the Shoney's case. No one 
contended that the black workers that Danner did not want custom-
ers to see were less able. They were considered to be less valuable 
because certain customers appeared to dislike seeing them. Thus, 
the value that was being equated to price was not the intrinsic value 
of these workers but their contingent value in light of racist cus-
tomer preferences. It would not be surprising to learn that this ap-
parently widespread racist attitude would depress the demand for 
black labor. As a result, black wages would be lower than the 
wages of otherwise identical white workers. This underscores the 
difference between labor markets - in which prices are deter-
mined by supply and demand, with discriminatory attitudes of em-
ployers, fellow employees, and customers influencing the demand 
- and capital markets - in which an arbitrage model of pricing is 
appropriate and price will be determined only by the intrinsic value 
of the asset.ss While the demand for stocks is perfectly elastic, no 
study of labor demand has ever found it to be highly elastic, let 
alone horizontal.S6 
Moreover, the market penalty for the full array of Shoney's dis-
criminatory practices, some of which enhanced and some of which 
diminished profits, was not particularly powerful. Indeed, only the 
intervention of antidiscrimination law established the costliness of 
the racist policy, at which point the market did encourage the de-
parture of a severely discriminatory owner. Although Danner's ra-
cist policy of not hiring visible black employees might have been 
profit-maximizing to the extent it accorded with customer prefer-
ence, his general antipathy to hiring any black supervisory workers 
even in nonvisible positions would not be consistent with profit 
54. Id. 
55. As Stephen Ross has written, 
If labor markets behaved like financial markets, the theories of finance would be used to 
study them .... 
Paul Samuelson's textbook on economics has the following anonymous quote, "You 
can make even a parrot into a learned political economist - all [it] must learn are the 
two words 'supply' and 'demand'." 
By contrast, the intuition of neoclassical finance is quite different ...• To make the 
parrot into a learned financial economist, he only needs to learn the single word 
"arbitrage." 
Ross, supra note 30, at 29-30 (quoting PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 52 (11th ed.1980)). 
56. See, e.g., Kim B. Clark & Richard B. Freeman, How Elastic ls the Demand for La-
bor?, 62 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 509, 518 (1980) (estimating the elasticity of demand for labor at 
.4 or .5). 
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maximization. Thus, although the market penalty for such non-
profit-maximizing discrimination did not seem to be capable of 
driving Danner from the market, the introduction of a sizable legal 
penalty enabled the market to achieve the desired social outcome. 
It is precisely this mechanism that might render Title VII efficient, 
as I have suggested elsewhere.57 But the important point here is 
that the value of black workers to Shoney's was not simply based on 
their intrinsic productivity but rather depended on the discrimina-
tory tastes of customers and the employer. This is the distinction 
between what the labor market achieves in terms of equating price 
and contingent value and what would be achieved if the labor mar-
ket functioned in the same fashion as the capital market. 
IV. THE GULF BETWEEN INTRINSIC EQUALITY AND 
CONSTRUCTED EQUALITY 
The preceding discussion has shown that equating price and 
value means different things in the labor market and the capital 
market and that the initial goal of employment discrimination law 
was to give black and other protected workers the same intrinsic 
equality that would be guaranteed if the labor market operated like 
a capital market. This of course explains why some of the oppo-
nents of the statute do not feel it is needed. Because they believe 
that the labor market operates identically to the capital market, 
they see no need to have the costly and cumbersome law step in to 
provide what the market already offers. 
But, at least thus far, the antagonists have not made much head-
way on this battle. The law is solidly entrenched, and the public at 
large seems to believe that protected workers are entitled to a legal 
guarantee that their labor will be compensated in the same fashion 
that it would be in a perfectly competitive and nondiscriminatory 
market. But the battles over the proper scope of employment dis-
crimination law are not limited to debates over whether the appro-
priate compensation for blacks is determined by the contingent 
equality between price and value guaranteed in a labor market or 
by the intrinsic equality that the capital market can provide. A sec-
ond front has opened between those who are satisfied with the goal 
of attaining intrinsic equality and those who feel that the law should 
go further than an idealized, perfectly competitive market might 
conceivably go. Those who find intrinsic equality to be insufficient 
57. See John J. Donohue III, ls Title Vll Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986); John 
J. Donohue III, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination Legislation: A Reply to 
Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 523 (1987). 
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believe that a higher level of what I call "constructed equality" 
should be the aim of the law. Interestingly, while the first success in 
the law of employment discrimination was the acknowledgement, if 
not the attainment, of the right to intrinsic equality, over time this 
demand for equality has come to be overshadowed in much the 
same way that the early demands of blacks for the equal protection 
of the laws subsequently came to be seen as wholly inadequate. 
A. The Evolving Conception of Equality 
In this regard, consider the NAACP's thirty-year battle designed 
to achieve racial equality through law58 - probably the most fa-
mous sustained litigative effort to achieve equality in our nation's 
history. The NAACP consciously adopted a two-step strategy in an 
effort to achieve the equal protection of law for black Americans. 
First, the NAACP relied on the equality component of the "sepa-
rate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson59 in its pursuit of im-
provements in the treatment of blacks. Given the severity and 
pernicious character of racial injustice in America over the period 
from the early 1920s through the early 1950s, this protracted phase 
of the NAACP's legal attack might seem to have been completely 
ineffective. In fact, this period was one of substantial progress in 
black southern education as measured by the convergence toward 
equality in "measured schooling inputs," such as the wages paid to 
black teachers, the length of the school year for black pupils, and 
the pupil-teacher ratios for black students.60 Despite the fact that 
southern blacks were without significant electoral power over this 
period, the NAACP's struggle to achieve equal, albeit separate, 
schooling for blacks seems to have generated considerable improve-
ments in virtually all C?tegories of educational quality inputs. By 
the early 1950s, when this first phase of the litigation strategy was 
ending, most southern states had nearly equalized these inputs for 
black and white students.61 
Having achieved this degree of racial equality, the NAACP then 
switched to its second phase of the legal strategy by attacking the 
58. See MARK TusHNET,_THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDU· 
CATION 1925-1950 (1987); see also Cass R. Sunstein, How Independent is the Court?, N.Y. 
REV. BooKs, Oct. 22, 1992, at 47 (reviewing W1LL1AM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: 
THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHN· 
SON (1992), and GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991)). 
59. 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896). 
60. See David Card & Alan B. Krueger, School Quality and Black-White Relative Earn-
ings: A Direct Assessment, 107 QJ. EcoN. 151, 167 (1992). 
61. Id. at 168. 
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constitutionality of the doctrine of "separate but equal" itself. In-
terestingly, the NAACP sought to achieve equality, first by using 
the existing legal framework to push for what the law had grudg-
ingly allowed at the level of constitutional doctrine but not in prac-
tice, and then by forcing the law to grant much more. Certainly, the 
relative gains in black education in the segregat,ed South prior to 
the decision in Brown v. Board of Education62 were dramatic and 
represented significant movements in the direction of equality. Yet 
only by thinking of equality as something more than the formalistic 
achievement of equal measured educational inputs was the 
Supreme Court able to advance racial equality in a much more 
profound way than would have been possible under the doctrine of 
legal segregation. · 
The quest for equality in labor markets has undergone a similar 
metamorphosis. First, the civil rights movement sought to achieve 
what the market had yet to offer to black Americans - wages 
equal to the true value of their labor in a nondiscriminatory envi-
ronment. This aspect of the civil rights movement was virtually a 
complete success, at least at the doctrinal and aspirational levels. 
At one point the idea that the government could coerce private em-
ployers to hire individuals that they did not wish to have ,as employ-
ees had little widespread support; today there is a staunch 
consensus that such coercion is appropriate to guarantee to pro-
tected workers what they would secure in a nondiscriminatory free 
market. Indeed, this consensus has become so dominant that one 
scholar has opined that it is virtually "forbidden" to question it.63 
As the goal of eradicating the appalling mistreatment of black 
Americans provided ihe battering ram against the doctrine of free-
dom of contract in employment, other disadvantaged groups - ini-
tially women and then the elderly and the disabled - attached 
themselves to this quest for legal equality in the workplace. Once 
this initial version of equality became widely accepted, the demands 
for a more aggressive employment discrimination policy began to 
grow. 
In the same way that the doctrine of "separate but equal" came 
to be seen as the embodiment of inequality - even though for dec-
ades it was the basis of a legal strategy to advance the status of 
blacks - the initial phase of employment discrimination law that 
tried to confer what a perfectly competitive market would provide 
62. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
63. See EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at xii-xiii. 
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has come to be seen by many as a stunted form of equality that 
represents an impediment to needed change. These claims to go 
beyond the protections of an idealized market are seen in the argu-
ment that the special burdens of childbirth and childrearing require 
preferential treatment of female employees. 64 Women are not to 
be given only what a pure profit-maximizing, nonmisogynistic em-
ployer would offer them; instead they should receive what the mod-
em conception of gender equality demands. 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act65 emerged in 1967 
from the combined support of those who sought to guarantee the 
intrinsic notion of equality - that is, what a non-ageist, idealized 
free market would yield to workers who were over the age of forty 
- and those who thought older workers needed to be protected 
from the market.66 The latter group was uncomfortable with the 
relentless logic of disregarding the surface attributes of race, color, 
religion, sex, or age and focusing exclusively on those traits purely 
related to productivity. In their opinion, the single-minded focus on 
worker productivity, which is the very essence of the intrinsic no-
tion of equality, could itself be the enemy of female and older 
workers. 
The requirement that employers shift their focus away from 
what an idealized market would offer to what fairness requires was 
taken a step further with the passage of the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (ADA).67 Like the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act before it, the ADA incqrporates a component of the market 
protection conception of antidiscrimination in that it prohibits em-
64. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 
201, 244 (arguing for statutes guaranteeing pregnant workers their jobs during pregnancy. 
related disability as a solution to existing workplace practices "structured with the expecta-
tion that workers would not be new mothers"); see also Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the 
Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REv. 803, 804, 833-34 (1990). 
65. 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1988). 
66. The Report of the Secretary of Labor to Congress under Section 715 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 - U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AoE Dts. 
CRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1965) - is very explicitly concerned with statistical discrimi-
nation leading to employment bans against the hiring of older workers. It found that 
"[a]pproximately half of all job openings which develop in the private economy each year are 
closed to applicants over 55 years of age" by virtue of firms setting specific age limits beyond 
which they will not consider a worker for a vacant job regardless of ability. Id. at 6. Because 
the presence of statistical discrimination implies that individual workers are not being paid 
their true value, the concern over statistical discrimination against the elderly reflected a 
demand for intrinsic equality for these workers. 
Conversely, while the market presumably penalizes those who are purely ageist - that is, 
irrationally biased against older workers - it rewards those who successfully reduce costs by 
not hiring older workers. This is an explicit concern discussed in the Secretary of Labor's 
report. See id. at 15-17. 
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. III 1991). 
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ployers from irrationally discriminating on the basis of a disability. 
A disabled worker who can perform the essential functions of a job 
may not be rejected because of an employer's irrational aversion to 
the worker's disability. This conforms precisely to the intrinsic no-
tion of equality - workers should receive what they would get in a 
nondiscriminatory free market. But, at the same time, the ADA is 
not content with this notion of equality. The Act goes much further 
by requiring employers to make reasonable accommodations that 
would enable disabled workers to perform adequately on the job.68 
Clearly, given a choice between two equally productive workers, 
one requiring the expenditure of significant sums in order to accom-
modate him and one requiring no such expenditures, the profit-
maximizing firm would prefer the worker who is less costly to hire. 
Thus, the transformation that has occurred in the realm of civil 
rights is that the ideal nondiscriminatory market solution, which 
previously was both the benchmark of intrinsic equality and what 
the law demanded, is now regarded as the obstacle to social justice. 
B. The Tripartite Equality Frameworks 
The framework of contingent, intrinsic, and constructed equality 
offers insights into some of the major issues of employment discrim-
ination law. For example, some have argued that the Supreme 
Court's creation of the disparate impact doctrine represented a de-
parture from the congressional intent to prohibit only intentional 
discrimination.69 The claim is that the disparate impact standard 
represents an unwarranted shift in Title VII's purpose from guaran-
teeing equality of opportunity to ensuring equality of result. But 
the move to a disparate impact standard, which was ultimately en-
dorsed by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, is consistent 
with the goal of trying to guarantee intrinsic equality. Neutral rules 
that adversely affect protected workers without being tightly tied to 
their productivity are obstacles to the attainment of intrinsic equal-
ity, because the use of such neutral rules reflects the existence of 
statistical discrimination. As we saw above, intrinsic equality, 
which is defined by what would exist in a market that was as per-
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111(9), 12,112(b)(B) (Supp. III 1991). 
69. See, e.g., Michael E. Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and 
Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommenda-
tion for Reform, 7 !Nous. REL. LJ. 429 (1985). 
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fectly competitive as the capital market, cannot coincide with statis-
tical discrimination.10 
In addition, the tripartite equality framework can also be used 
to focus discussion concerning the likely success of various legal in-
terventions. Intrinsic equality will necessarily be easier to generate 
than constructed equality because the pressures of the market at 
least push in the direction of intrinsic equality, but they steadfastly 
resist the attainment of constructed equality. This is not to say that 
the attainment of intrinsic equality is relentlessly encouraged by the 
market. For example, pure market forces do not encourage the hir-
ing of groups that are disfavored by the employer, fellow employ-
ees, or customers, nor do they dictate the disregard of low-cost 
statistical proxies that generate a reasonably productive work force. 
Still, if workers could be properly sorted throughout the economy, a 
market equilibrium could exist in which every worker was being 
paid precisely his or her intrinsic value.71 This could not happen 
with respect to constructed equality, because any employer who 
was paying a worker more than the worker's intrinsic value would 
find it advantageous to replace the worker.72 This implies that in-
trinsic equality is at least in theory a goal that is attainable for all 
workers. Conversely, ambitious efforts to extend the enlarged de-
mands of constructed equality to a growing array of protected 
workers moves society away from a conceptually attainable goal to 
an amorphous objective, which can only be defined through wran-
gling among conflicting interests in the political process. This fact 
in no way undermines the desirability of certain objectives, but it 
does suggest that political power may play a greater role than prin-
cipled discourse in determining the future contours of constructed 
equality. 
70. In efficient capital markets there is no statistical discrimination because it is always 
profitable to spend the resources to ascertain the value of individual financial securities. In 
labor markets it is frequently not profitable to ascertain the true value of individual workers. 
71. Another way of expressing this point is that the labor market, in equilibrium, gener-
ates contingent equality, and within the set of contingently equal outcomes are a subset of 
intrinsically equal outcomes that would be unlikely to be generated in a labor market but that 
could be maintained in equilibrium if they were somehow attained. 
72. One might qualify this point by stating that if the employer expenditures that were 
necessary to accommodate, say, a disabled worker, have already been paid - that is, they 
are sunk costs - then the position of constructed equality could be a stable equilibrium, 
even though it would not be one that would be generated by a labor market. If the costs of 
accommodation are continuing, however, the pure market incentive would be to replace the 
disabled worker with an equally productive worker who imposed no burden of 
accommodation. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the two decades following World War II, the desire to find a 
remedy for the egregious misconduct directed toward American 
blacks coalesced into· a belief that because contingent equality -
the best that the labor market could supply - was insufficient, the 
government must intervene to supply the greater intrinsic equality 
that would be generated by a more perfectly competitive market. 
The passage of Title VII would not have been possible without the 
conceptual and political shift that allowed a majority of the public 
to embrace the view that federal regulation of employment was 
needed to correct the injustice being visited upon black Americans. 
In the late days of the debate over Title VII, women succeeded in 
becoming one of the protected categories that benefited from this 
conceptual and political development.73 At the same time, con-
cerns about discriinination against the elderly emerged, leading to a 
provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 calling for the Secretary of 
Labor to study and report to Congress on the problem of age dis-
crimination.74 The elderly followed in this quest for intrinsic equal-
ity with the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
designed to achieve what the imperfections of the labor market ren-
dered unattainable without intervention. Even the early stages of 
affirmative action represented an attempt to move the employment 
of blacks to the level that would exist in a perfectly competitive 
market. But whereas employment discrimination law first used the 
notion of the market to advance the status of protected workers, it 
then rejected it, in much the same way that the NAACP litigative 
strategy at first relied upon the doctrine of separate but equal to 
advance black welfare but ultimately rejected that same doctrine. 
Primarily through litigative efforts on behalf of female and eld-
erly employees, the courts began to broaden the notion of equality 
beyond what a perfect market could give to what a perfect market 
would negate. Advocates of affirmative action began not only to 
seek the idealized market solution but to push for broader social 
justice. In this vision of constructed equality, the dictates of law are 
defined no longer through some abstract market paradigm but 
rather through considering what steps would be necessary to define 
a fair society. Releasing the law and its goals from the theoretical 
confines of a market paradigm has the advantage of freeing it to 
73. See John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Eco-
nomic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1337, 1337-38 (1989). 
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1988). 
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promote a more refined notion of justice, especially in light of the 
nonmarket roles of women as childbearers and caretakers, than 
would otherwise have been possible. On the other hand, freed 
from the theoretical mooring that the market paradigm provided, 
the malleable claims for constructed equality began to proliferate in 
ways that have weakened the moral force of antidiscrimination law. 
Employment discrimination law began to provide avenues for wind-
fall gains rather than opportunities for promoting corrective justice, 
and the moral imperative that impelled the civil rights movement 
has been blunted to the extent that employment discrimination pro-
tections have been extended by special interest legislation to 
groups, such as smokers, with little to commend their legislative de-
mands other than the political power of tobacco companies. 
The ADA has imposed perhaps the greatest demands of con-
structed equality by explicitly requiring that employers take reason-
able measures to make the disabled equal. Rather than the early 
Title VII insistence that employers disregard the traits of protected 
workers, the ADA requires employers to identify the traits of the 
disabled that undermine their productivity and to seek whenever 
possible to overcome these traits. The ADA has paved the way for 
the possibility that economically disadvantaged minorities such as 
blacks, whose position as the central focus of employment discrimi-
nation law has gradually diminished, will employ the ADA's ration-
ale to argue that the effects of the factors that have undermined 
their productivity - including very poor schooling and broken 
families - are now to be corrected by employers. Although the 
conceptual groundwork for this step has been laid, the fracturing of 
the consensus forged by the civil rights movement may render this 
next step unattainable in the current political environment. 
